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Introduction: The aim of this paper was to investigate the association between health, social position, social
participation and the welfare state. Extending recent research on the social consequences of poor health, we asked
whether and how welfare generosity is related to the risk of social exclusion associated with combinations of poor
health, low education and economic inactivity.
Methods: Our analyses are based on data from the European Social Survey, round 3 (2006/7), comprising between
21,205 and 21,397 individuals, aged 25–59 years, within 21 European welfare states. The analyses were conducted
by means of multilevel logistic regression analysis in STATA 12.
Results: The results demonstrated that the risk of non-participation in social networks decreased as welfare
generosity increased. The risk of social exclusion, i.e. non-participation in social networks among disadvantaged
groups, seldom differed from the overall association, and in absolute terms it was invariably smaller in more
generous welfare state contexts.
Conclusions: The results showed that there were no indications of higher levels of non-participation among
disadvantaged groups in more generous welfare states. On the contrary, resources made available by the welfare
state seemed to matter to all individuals in terms of overall lower levels of non-participation. As such, these results
demonstrate the importance of linking health related social exclusion to the social policy context.
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Poor health might have social and economic consequences
[1,2]. Comparative health inequality research has recently
directed attention in particular to the opportunities to
participate in the labour market, and how they relate to
the social policy context [3-7]. These studies demonstrate
higher employment rates among individuals in poor
health in more comprehensive welfare states. Extending
this emerging field of research beyond employment studies,
we ask whether and how welfare generosity is related to
the risk of social exclusion in terms of non-participation
associated with combinations of poor health, low education
and economic inactivity. As such our research adds to
the existing literature an empirical extension of the social
consequences of illness-concept. We also use insights from* Correspondence: therese.saltkjel@hioa.no
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orthe concepts of social capital and social exclusion on how
and why social networks and social participation are
important dimensions of full participation and welfare
in society. Thus, the paper also adds new knowledge to
the social participation and social exclusion literature by
explicitly studying social inequality in the association be-
tween welfare state arrangements and social participation.
There are at least two contradictory perspectives on the
role of welfare states in the formation of social participa-
tion. One emphasizes the role of collective resources made
available by the welfare state in enabling and stimulating
social participation, what we label the welfare resources
perspective [8,9]. The other perspective, the crowding-out
hypothesis, warns against detrimental effects of large
welfare states: they cause deterioration in civic engagement
by taking over tasks traditionally carried out by families and
social networks [10,11]. The aim of this paper is to further
investigate these two contrasting hypotheses.Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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The concepts of social exclusion and social capital
emphasize the importance of participation in social
networks [12]. According to the concept of social exclusion,
individuals who lack or are denied access to full and active
participation in all or at least key aspects of customary
social life are at risk of social exclusion [12,13]. Social
networks and civic participation are two important dimen-
sions of social exclusion, among a number of other dimen-
sions [14]. Within the conceptual framework of social
exclusion, social relations provide social support and
prevent social isolation [12]. The concept of social capital,
although acknowledging these potential gains, has much
broader expectations of the benefits of social networks:
they may also provide material resources, practical as-
sistance, information, and so on. The result of participa-
tion in networks might thus be the ability to achieve
objectives otherwise not available to the individual on
his/her own [15].
Putnam [16] offers an applicable distinction between two
different forms of networks, that is, ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’
networks. While bonding networks tend to be inward
looking, maintaining homogeneity, bridging networks are
heterogeneous and outward-looking and link people across
social divides, with the potential of accessing resources be-
yond their own bonding networks [16,17]. Taken together,
social participation gives access to resources important to
both ‘get by’ and to ‘get ahead’ [16,18]. The greater the
command over resources, the greater the leeway to realize
one’s life chances [19].
In the social capital literature, social participation appears
to be the antidote to social exclusion [12]. In Putnam’s
somewhat communitarian approach, social capital is
non-exclusive and accessible to all [15,16]. Disadvantaged
individuals need only to participate and enjoy the payoffs.
Putnam’s approach ultimately implies that redistribution
is unnecessary [12,16]. However, the communitarian
approach to social capital is contested. Lin [20] argues
that social capital is unequally distributed across social
positions, because individuals tend to associate with
others of similar socio-economic characteristics. Hence,
not all networks have equal amounts of resources.
Poor health, low social position and economic inactivity,
although sometimes regarded as part of the social exclu-
sion phenomenon, are also important risk factors of social
exclusion [14]. Numerous empirical studies have demon-
strated the association between these risks and social
participation [10,16,21-28]. Individuals in poor health may
be excluded from social participation in several ways. First,
poor health may independently hinder social participation
because of lack of physical or psychological energy neces-
sary to interact with other people. Poor health may also be
accompanied by physical impairments, which could make
the ill person withdraw in shame, or suffer from thediscrimination of others. Second, when combined with
low educational level or non-employment, the risk of
social isolation and exclusion increases because of the
deprivation of important financial resources, human
capital, and work-related social networks. Third, as pointed
out by Lin [20], the quality, in terms of resources, of the
social networks which are available to disadvantaged groups
may be substantially poorer, or even detrimental to certain
outcomes, and may hinder participation in bridging social
networks. Hence, social disadvantage may be reproduced
in bonding social networks through ‘vicious and virtuous
circles’ [29], and increase the risk of social exclusion.
We theoretically assume that participation in different
networks is an essential part of customary social life
and hence one important dimension of social exclusion.
Although there are also other important dimensions, in
this paper we study participation, or rather non –partici-
pation, and refer to it as risk of social exclusion.
The social policy context
The role of welfare states in the formation of social
participation is a matter of dispute [10,11,16,24,30-33].
The welfare resources perspective hypothesizes that
generous welfare states may buffer the extent to which
social disadvantage in one area of life causes disadvantage
in another area of life, and hence diminish the risk of cu-
mulative disadvantage and social exclusion. For instance,
labour market exclusion may or may not lead to a weak-
ening of social ties, depending on the level of freedom ex-
perienced by the non-employed in terms of participatory
resources: being able to receive guests at home or bring a
small gift to a party; having proper clothing to attend
social events; having the financial resources to travel, or
to pay participation fees in voluntary organizations, and
so on. The more generous social benefits are, the less
likely it is that job loss will lead to social exclusion.
Similarly, welfare resources can enable individuals in
poor health to overcome health impairments that would
otherwise hinder social participation, for example, having
the financial resources to buy medicine or having ac-
cess to publicly funded/subsidized aids (e.g. wheelchair,
hearing aid, etc.), or personal assistance. As for the low
educated, having the financial resources to attend sports,
leisure or cultural activities might give access to diverse
social arenas and bridging networks otherwise not available
through one’s own network of similar socio-economic
characteristics [20].
Participatory resources may be individual (e.g. savings,
skills, health, etc.) or provided by family, or they may be
collective, for example, provided by the welfare state.
From a welfare resources perspective [8] we would expect
lower levels of non-participation among disadvantaged
groups in more generous welfare states, because more
resources are made available to them.
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American state theory, a strong state undermines civil
society [34]. This perspective, the crowding-out hypoth-
esis, suggests that generous welfare states mute formation
of social networks, social relations and civic participation
through colonizing tasks otherwise tended by families and
local communities [11]. This ‘crowding out’ of civic society
may lead to increased welfare dependency, weakening
people’s ability to work with one another and cooperate
and their willingness to participate and engage in public
affairs, resulting in increased social isolation, weakening
of moral ties and anomie [10,11,33]. Social networks and
the supportiveness of local social relations available to
disadvantaged groups in generous welfare states may
therefore be insufficient to prevent and alleviate social
exclusion. For instance, someone living in a generous
welfare state, who loses her job, may have sufficient
income, due to generous benefits, but may still have an
elevated risk of social exclusion compared to the corre-
sponding case in a moderate welfare state. This is because
the quality and extent of social networks, communities
and voluntary organizations is less evolved, and hence
they are less able to include the unemployed person in
meaningful activities and provide social support, resulting
in an increased risk of cumulative disadvantage and social
exclusion. Thus, the crowding-out hypothesis expects
higher levels of non-participation among disadvantaged
groups in more generous welfare states.
Welfare generosity and social participation –
previous findings
The majority of recent studies demonstrated that welfare
state matters in terms of (average levels of) social capital,
including formal and informal social participation among
the citizens [35]. Some of the most recent (mainly) multi-
level comparative studies nonetheless showed that the
results in some instances depend on the measure of social
participation applied (formal vs. informal). In addition, the
scarce results on the impact of welfare generosity among
disadvantaged groups appear inconclusive. Finally, most
of the studies applied variations of a welfare generosity
measure based on social expenditure as percentage of
GDP, none of which took the extent of ‘need’ in the
population into account [36].
Gesthuizen et al. [24] showed that the national level of
social security did not affect informal social capital, but
increased membership in voluntary organizations [24];
the latter was also demonstrated in a former study by
Gesthuizen et al. [37]. Anderson [21] demonstrated that
individuals in countries with higher spending on active
labour market policies reported more frequent social inter-
actions, increased membership in voluntary organizations
and a reduced sense of social exclusion. Moreover, the
positive associations were found for both labour-marketinsiders and outsiders; however, the association with social
ties and perception of social inclusion were stronger among
outsiders (unemployed actively/not actively looking) [21].
Gelissen et al. [35] demonstrated that welfare generosity
was associated with most of the individual-level factors,
including participation in formal networks, which tended
to be significantly higher among individuals who live in
countries with higher levels of welfare provision. There
was, however, no significant effect on contact frequency
with friends by welfare generosity [35]. Van Ingen and
van der Meer [38] also demonstrated that inequality in
organizational participation across education, gender
and income were smaller in countries with higher levels
of welfare generosity. In the study by van der Meer et al.
[39] the results showed that welfare generosity did not
have a significant effect on participation within the nu-
clear family, or on interaction with friends. However,
welfare generosity had a crowding-out effect on participa-
tion within the extended family (uncle, aunt, cousin) [39].
Moreover, this negative effect was stronger for people
with a low income than for people with a high income.
The study nonetheless demonstrated a significant and
positive effect of welfare generosity on social participation
with nuclear and extended family among disabled individ-
uals. Another multilevel study provided support for the
crowding-out thesis in that volunteering was lower in
extensive welfare states than in countries that spent less
on welfare state policy; however, welfare generosity did
not significantly affect volunteering among low-income
groups [31]. Finally, the comparative study by van
Oorschot and Finsveen [29] showed no clear relationship
between lower inequality of social capital and more devel-
oped welfare states.
To sum up, the variables measuring participation in
formal and informal networks varied between the reviewed
studies. In the literature formal networks were often exem-
plified by contacts within voluntary organizations. Friends,
family, neighbours and colleagues were common examples
of informal networks [17]. The distinction between bridging
and bonding networks within the conceptual framework of
social capital is related to the social characteristics of the
members in the networks. In the former case the networks
are heterogeneous, and in the latter homogeneous, in terms
of social characteristics [17]. Despite these conceptual
differences, both informal networks and (strong) bonds
provide emotional support, while both formal networks
and (weak) bridges provide (wide) formal support [17].
It seems that most of the variables on participation
in informal networks in the studies reviewed measured
frequencies of contact with informal networks. In the
studies highlighted here it was only the study by Anderson
[21] that demonstrated a significant positive effect of
welfare generosity on informal networks. The study by
van der Meer et al. [39] also showed a significant negative
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significant positive effect among disabled individuals
on social participation with nuclear and extended family.
Most of these studies nonetheless demonstrated a signifi-
cant positive effect of welfare generosity on participation
in formal networks, with the exception of the study by
Stadelman-Steffen [31], who demonstrated a significant
negative effect among upper and middle social classes.
Due to these rather inconsistent findings, in this study
we chose to apply two dependent variables, that is, non-
participation in formal and informal networks, within
the context of the available data of the European Social
Survey (2006/7).
Social expenditure as percentage of GDP is one of the
most commonly used indicator of welfare generosity in
the empirical literature [31]. The expenses approach
has been criticized for not sufficiently addressing social
citizenship and social rights as core defining characteris-
tics of the welfare state [40]. An institutional approach
however was not possible in this paper as available com-
parative databases (SCIP and CWED) only comprise about
half of the countries (12 out of 21) included in our ana-
lyses [40-42]. The validity of the institutional approach
has also met objections for the underlying assumption of
the ‘average production worker’ [43]; a description which
does not fit many Europeans today [40]. Another main
criticism of the expenses, or welfare generosity approach,
is that welfare state effort becomes relative to the size of
the GDP, while what matters to people is the level of living
that social spending buys [36]. Furthermore, higher social
expenditures may only reflect higher social needs, such as
mass unemployment, and may not reflect adequately the
average resources made available to people not provided
for by the market. Therefore, a measure of welfare gener-
osity should take the extent of ‘need’ in the population
into account [36]. The present paper meets these objec-
tions in that we used a measure of social expenditure in
purchasing power standard (PPS) per capita inhabitant,
adjusted for the level of need in each country (see also
[44]). As far as we know, this is the first study of welfare
state generosity and social participation that applies social
spending data in this way. In addition, this study adds
to the existing knowledge on group-specific effects of
welfare generosity [31], including groups with double-
disadvantages that is, poor health combined with either
low education or non-employment. Finally, this study
extends previous research on the social consequences
of poor health within a welfare state context, including
social participation as an outcome.
Data and methods
The data set
This article is based on the repeat cross-sectional European
Social Survey (ESS), round 3 (2006/7) [45]. The overall aimof the ESS survey is to monitor public attitudes and values
and to study how these change and interact with institu-
tions within Europe [46]. The ESS3 integrated file net sam-
ple size is 43,000 individuals within 23 countries. For more
information about sample size, response rates, and so on,
see the ESS Documentation Report [46].
Our analyses included between 21,205 and 21,397
respondents, aged between 25 and 59 years, living in
21 European countries (see Table 1). Ukraine and Russia
were left out of the analysis, due to missing data on the
welfare generosity measure.Dependent variables
Two dependent variables were included in this study in
order to measure two important dimensions of social
exclusion, that is, non-participation in informal and formal
networks. Non-participation in informal networks was
assessed by the following question: ‘How often do you
meet socially with friends/relatives/ work colleagues?’. The
answers within the range of 1 ‘never’ to 7 ‘every day’, were
dichotomized such that the responses ‘never’, ‘less than
once a month’ and ‘once a month’ were given the value
of 1, labelled ‘non-participation in informal networks’.
All the other values were given the value 0.
Non-participation in formal networks is a measure
including two questions, with responses ranging from
1 to 6: (a) ‘In the past 12 months, how often did you
get involved in work for voluntary or charitable organi-
zations?’ and (b) ‘In the past 12 months, how often did
you help with or attend activities in your local area?’.
The response options ranged from 1 ‘at least once a
week’ to 6 ‘never’. The two variables were collapsed
and dichotomized. The responses for both variables,
including ‘never’ and ‘less often’ (‘than at least once
every six months’) were given the value of 1, labelled
‘non-participation in formal networks’. All the other
responses were given the value 0.Contextual variable
The contextual variable labelled ‘welfare generosity’
was measured in purchasing power standards per capita,
including social protection benefits (direct transfers in
cash or in kind) on unemployment, sickness and disability,
housing, and social exclusion, derived from the Eurostat
database,The European System of Integrated Social Protec-
tion Statistics (ESSPROS), for the year 2006 [47]. The
sum of the social protection benefits was divided by the
inverse of Eurostat’s employment rate in the age group
15-64 years for the year 2006. The aim was, although
imperfectly, to adjust for the level of need in each country
[36,44]. This measure has previously been applied by
van der Wel et al. [6,40].
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We computed two sets of combined dummy variables
to measure social disadvantage. One (set 1) consisted of
combinations of the indicator variables, non-employment
and self-perceived health. The other (set 2), included
combinations of educational attainment and self-perceived
health. This approach resulted in 4 group variables in
set 1, and 6 group variables in set 2.
Self-perceived health was assessed by the question ‘How
is your (physical and mental) health in general?’ The
response options were ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘bad’ and
‘very bad’. The variable was dichotomized such that the
response options ‘very good’, ‘good’, and ‘fair’ were given
the value 0. The responses ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’ were given
the value 1, labelled ‘poor health’.
Non-employment was assessed by a question measuring
the respondent’s main activity during the previous 7 days.
Nine response categories were eligible. The variable applied
was the post-coded version of this variable available in the
data file [48]. The categories ‘in paid work’, ‘in education’
and ‘in community service’ were included in the category
labelled ‘employed’ (0). All the other categories, that is,
‘unemployed’, ‘permanently sick or disabled’, ‘retired’, ‘doing
housework’, ‘looking after children’ and ‘other’ were included
in the category labelled ‘non-employed’ (1). Educational
attainment was based on a harmonized variable based on
country specific questionnaire item(s) assessed by the
question: ‘What is the highest level of education you have
achieved?’ The coding is based on the International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-1997) [49].
The variable was recoded into three dummy variables:
‘primary’ (ISCED 0–1 and 2), ‘secondary’ (ISCED 3) and
‘tertiary’ education (ISCED 4 and 5–6).
As control variables we included gender, age, living with
children, immigration status (born in the country), and
marital status. Marital status was coded as ‘married or
cohabiting’ (value 1) for responses ‘married’ and ‘in civil
partnership’. All other responses ‘separated (still legally
married)’, ‘separated (still in a civil partnership)’, ‘divorced’,
‘widowed’, ‘formerly in civil partnership, now dissolved’,
‘formerly in civil partnership, partner died’, ‘never married
AND never in a civil partnership’ were given the value 0.
Analysis – multilevel approach
The underlying assumption of multilevel models is that
individuals are shaped by the social context to which
they belong, that is, individuals from the same countries
are more alike than individuals from different countries
[50]. Thus, the advantage of multilevel techniques in
the setting of the present paper is the opportunity to
simultaneously study the effects of individual-level vari-
ables, contextual variables and cross-level influences on
an individual-level outcome. We used multilevel random
intercept analysis with binary outcomes available in thextlogit procedure in STATA 12. A design weight was
applied in the descriptive analyses to correct for different
probabilities of selection [46]. The multilevel analyses
were not weighted. In the random intercept model, a
significant intercept variance indicates a systematic
variation in the outcome variable from country to country
(i.e. random effect). However, within the countries the
effect of explanatory variables applies to all cases [50].
Our analytical approach was to analyse the impact
of different constellations of poor health combined
with other social disadvantages on social participation.
Therefore, for each of the two dependent variables, two
separate analyses were carried out. One analysis included
on the right-hand side the various possible health and
employment combinations (set 1), and the other analysis
included the education and health combinations (set 2).
To assess whether the link between these different forms
of social disadvantages and exclusion from social participa-
tion varied with welfare generosity, we used cross-level
interaction terms.
Results
Descriptives
Table 1 shows the proportion in each country reporting
poor health, non-employment and various levels of educa-
tion, and who are classified as excluded from participation
in informal and formal social networks. In the first column
the level of welfare generosity in each country is also
reported. The Eastern European countries had very high
proportions of residents not participating in either informal
or formal social networks, with Hungary as an extreme case
(non-participation rates of 80.43% in formal networks and
47.66% informal networks). Within these countries the
levels of welfare generosity were also the lowest. At the
other end of the distribution within the Scandinavian
countries, in particular, Denmark and Norway, the levels
of welfare generosity were among the highest. Among
the southern countries the results demonstrated that
Portugal had the lowest proportion of non-participation
in informal networks (4.9%) among all the countries in the
study. However, Portugal had high proportions of non-
participation in formal networks (76.36%). The Bismarckian
countries seemed to take a middle position; however, there
were variations. Switzerland had the lowest level of non-
participation in formal networks in the study (36.65%), and
low levels of non-participation in informal networks
(7.77%). Lastly, within the Anglo-Saxon countries, the
United Kingdom and Ireland, the proportions of non-
participation in informal networks were rather high,
20.81% in the UK and 25.11% in Ireland, respectively.
Multilevel analyses
Table 2 shows the analyses including each of the two
dependent variables, i.e non-participation in informal (A)
Table 1 Welfare generosity and proportions of individuals (aged 25–59 years) within countries reporting non-
participation in formal and informal networks, poor health, non-employment and educational attainment (%)
Country Welfare
generosity
Non-participation –
formal
Non-participation –
informal
Poor
health
Non-
employed
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Norway 220.75 34.6 5.69 4.27 12.61 9.02 33.14 57.83
Denmark 180.83 39.21 8.66 3.58 14.72 12.87 34.62 52.51
Netherland 176.06 49.93 6.88 3.25 28.11 32.6 27.75 39.65
Switzerland 173.94 36.65 7.77 2.14 23.59 17.42 48.4 34.18
Sweden 162.66 58.52 10.06 3.35 9.6 33.27 31.5 35.23
United Kingdom 127.31 49.91 20.81 4.55 20.77 37.18 12.23 50.59
Finland 113.82 59.7 12.82 2.39 15.71 16.0 41.15 42.84
Austria 112.34 42.14 11.68 2.69 20.49 13.52 66.9 19.57
Germany 109.66 49.92 17.78 6.93 27.29 7.08 58.03 34.9
Ireland 108.63 44.32 25.11 2.61 30.99 28.72 22.69 48.59
France 96.44 49.73 12.72 5.22 20.63 19.95 47.22 32.83
Belgium 93.69 50.3 13.08 3.17 24.36 21.88 40.1 38.02
Spain 72.81 56.03 8.84 4.92 21.75 42.47 19.39 38.14
Slovenia 63.11 52.98 28.55 6.17 27.14 16.83 56.3 26.88
Portugal 61.29 76.36 4.94 8.34 24.82 68.17 17.86 13.97
Cyprus 55.70 75.9 27.92 2.14 28.97 19.27 52.34 28.39
Hungary 34.43 80.43 47.66 11.41 31.31 23.45 53.47 23.08
Slovakiab 26.84 74.4 19.71 5.78 26.44 10.28 75.42 14.3
Estonia 24.95 78.8 23.75 5.69 15.42 10.24 44.75 45.01
Poland 17.88 81.67 40.41 8.27 33.27 15.24 64.36 20.4
Bulgaria 11.99 89.23 22.66 9.31 33.46 23.1 51.57 25.33
Source: ESS3 2006/7 [45]. A design weight (dweight) has been applied in the ESS dataset to correct for different probabilities of selection.
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS (welfare generosity) [47].
bDue to lack of social spending data on housing and social exclusion for Slovakia for the year 2006, we have included the mean of the years 2002–2004.
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employment combinations (set 1). The results indicate
that the risk of being excluded from participation in
informal social networks (A) increased with age and
lower educational level, and was higher among immi-
grants and among those who lived with children or
were married/cohabiting. In addition, there was a sig-
nificant difference between men and women in non-
participation in informal networks, whereby men faced
a lower risk (Table 2(A)).
The analysis including non-participation in formal
networks (B) as dependent variable shows that the risk
of non-participation increased with lower level of edu-
cation and was higher among immigrants. The risk of
non-participation in formal networks was however, lower
among those who lived with children in the household
and were married or cohabiting, and decreased with age.
Again, men faced a lower risk than women.
Running the analysis without any contextual or inter-
action terms showed that the risk of non-participation
increased with social disadvantage (results not reported).
In the analysis including non-participation in formalnetworks (B) it was only the coefficient for those who
reported poor self-rated health and were non-employed
that was significant. However, due to the fixed level 1
residual variance (π2/3), we have to be cautious comparing
regression coefficients and variances across models [50,51].
Column 1 in Table 2(A) shows that welfare generosity
generally decreased the risk of non-participation in
informal social networks. Due to the inclusion of cross-
level interaction terms between the group variables and
welfare generosity, the main effect of welfare generosity
reflects the effect in the reference category, that is, those
who are employed and in good health. The coefficient,
however, also must be taken into account when evaluating
the interaction terms. In a model without cross-level
interaction terms the coefficient for welfare generosity
was practically similar (not shown). Again, we have to
be cautious comparing regression coefficients across
models [51]. In Table 2(A) the results demonstrate no
significant modifying effect of welfare generosity on non-
participation in informal networks among disadvantaged
individuals, that is, those who reported poor self-rated
health and were non-employed.
Table 2 Multilevel logistic regression analysis of
non-participation in networks: informal (A) and formal (B),
self-rated health and employment, and welfare generosity,
unstandardized regression coefficients (B), (N = 21,397
and 21,205 individuals nested within N = 21 countries)
Variables Informal (A) Formal (B)
Fixed part
Intercept −2.494*** 2.239***
Gender (male =1, female = 0) -.08578* -.07049*
Age .03039*** -.00815***
Education (ref. Tertiary)
Primary .5656*** .7662***
Secondary .312*** .4133***
Children (1 = yes, 0 = no) .3082*** -.321***
Born in the country (1 = yes, 0 = no) -.2116** -.4721***
Married or cohabiting .1033* -.2446***
Health and employment
(ref. Good health and employed)
Good health and non-employed -.03874 .2165*
Poor health and employed -.07949 .1042
Poor health and non-employed .3039 .3233
Contextual variable
Welfare generosity -.009018*** -.01058***
Cross-level interaction terms
(ref. Good health and employed ×
welfare generosity)
Good health and non-employed ×
welfare generosity
.000584 -.001479*
Poor health and employed ×
welfare generosity
.005266* -.00097
Poor health and non-employed ×
welfare generosity
.003441* -.00015
Random part
Standard deviation of random interceptb .591919 .385481
Intraclass correlation (ρ) .096249 .043216
Log likelihood −8597 −13143
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
b all higher-level variances are significant at p < 0.001 (likelihood ratio test).
Null-model: non-participation, informal:
Standard deviation of random interceptb: 0.770282.
Intraclass correlation (ρ): 0.152795.
Null model: non-participation, formal:
Standard deviation of random interceptb: 0.735715.
Intraclass correlation (ρ): 0.141283.
Source: ESS3 2006/7 [45].
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS (welfare generosity) [47].
Table 3 Multilevel logistic regression analysis of
non-participation in networks: informal (A) and formal (B),
self-rated health and education, and welfare generosity,
unstandardized regression coefficients (B), (N = 21,397
and 21,205 individuals nested within N = 21 countries)
Variables Informal (A) Formal (B)
Fixed part
Intercept −2.38*** 2.178***
Gender (male = 1, female = 0) -.07761 -.06898*
Age .03031*** -.008031***
Children (1 = yes, 0 = no) .3091*** -.3248***
Born in the country (1 = yes, 0 = no) -.2112** -.4658***
Married or cohabiting .1036* -.2459***
Non-employed .03918 .07852*
Health and education
(ref. Good health and tertiary)
Poor health and tertiary .4272 .4806
Good health and secondary .1481 .5673***
Poor health and secondary .2953 .5386*
Good health and primary .315** .8131***
Poor health and primary .52* .9887***
Contextual variable
Welfare generosity -.01037*** -.01017***
Cross-level interaction terms
(ref. Good health and tertiary ×
welfare generosity)
Poor health and tertiary ×
welfare generosity
.003356 -.00269
Good health and secondary ×
welfare generosity
.001865* -.001372*
Poor health and secondary ×
welfare generosity
.006244** -.0004
Good health and primary ×
welfare generosity
.002843* -.00043
Poor health and primary ×
welfare generosity
.005119* -.00008
Random part
Standard deviation of random interceptb .588563 .385413
Intraclass correlation (ρ) .095264 .043201
Log likelihood −8594 −13144
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
b all higher level variances are significant at p < 0.001 (likelihood ratio test).
Null-model: non-participation, informal:
Standard deviation of random interceptb: 0.770282.
Intraclass correlation (ρ): 0.152795.
Null-model: non-participation, formal:
Standard deviation of random interceptb: 0.735715.
Intraclass correlation (ρ): 0.141283.
Source: ESS3 2006/7 [45].
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS (welfare generosity) [47].
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in the second column of Table 2(B) again exhibits strong
negative effects of welfare generosity and few differences
in the effect across social groups. However, a significant
effect of welfare generosity could be observed for the
category that reported good health and were non-employed
(Table 2(B)).Table 3 shows the analyses including each of the two
dependent variables, i.e non-participation in informal
(A) and formal (B) networks and the various health and
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indicate that the risk of being excluded from participation
in informal social networks increased with age, and was
higher among immigrants and among those who lived with
children or were married/cohabiting. The analysis including
non-participation in formal networks as dependent variable
(Table 3B) shows that the risk of non-participation in for-
mal networks was higher among the non-employed, how-
ever lower among those who lived with children in the
household and were married or cohabiting, and decreased
with age. There was a significant difference between men
and women, whereby men faced a lower risk. In models
with no contextual variables the coefficients for the group
variables indicated increasing risk of social exclusion with
increasing disadvantage (tables not shown).
In Table 3(A) the coefficients for the cross-level
interaction terms indicate a significant effect of welfare
generosity on non-participation in informal networks
for the most disadvantaged group, that is, those who
reported poor self-rated health and primary education.
However, the significant modifying effect for the group
that report good health and primary education was
somewhat stronger. Both coefficients were positive and
smaller in strength than the main effect of welfare gen-
erosity, meaning that the combined effects of welfare
generosity in these groups were attenuated compared
to the most advantaged group.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of welfare generosity
on non-participation in informal networks in predicted
probabilities for an average individual (who is married,
born in the country, and aged 42.4 years) within the actual
observed range of values on welfare generosity. The first
point along the horizontal axis (1) refers to the lowest ob-
served value on welfare generosity (11.99). The second
point (2) adds to the lowest observed value, the difference
between the highest observed value (220.75) and the lowest
(11.99), divided by 6 (11.99+34.79). At each point (3-6)0
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Figure 1 Predicted probabilities of non-participation in
informal networks by self-rated health and educational level
within the actual observed range of values on welfare
generosity. Based on Table 3(A).34.79 is added to the preceding sum (11.99+34.79+34.79
etc.). The shapes of the lines are slightly curvilinear with
a deflection at high values of the welfare-generosity vari-
able, due to the shape of the logistical curve (s-shape)
[52]. The results demonstrate that the mean difference
in effect between individuals who reported poor self-
rated health and had the lowest level of education and
individuals who reported good self-rated health and
had the highest level of education was substantial.
The findings for non-participation in formal networks
in the second column of Table 3(B) again exhibit strong
negative effects of welfare generosity. Although there
are few differences in the effect across social groups, a
significant effect of welfare generosity could be observed
for the category having good health and secondary edu-
cation (Table 3(B)).
But how strong are the effects of welfare generosity
on social participation? Calculations showed that the
maximum effect of welfare generosity on non-participation
in informal networks among the highest educated in good
health (who were born in the country, married and aged
42 years), was 0.18. The maximum effect was calculated by
subtracting the predicted group probability for the highest
observed value on welfare generosity from the lowest
observed value. Among the lowest educated in poor
health the maximum effect was 0.19. Among the lowest
educated in good health the maximum effect was 0.20.
Compared to significant individual-level effects, expressed
in predicted probabilities, the maximum effect of welfare
generosity was as strong as, and stronger than most, other
observed effects (e.g. the probability of not participating in
informal social activities was 0.05 points higher for those
living with children compared to those not living with
children (0.06 points in a model including the cross-level
interaction terms), 0.02 points higher for those who were
married/cohabiting compared to those who were not
and 0.20 points higher for those with poor health and
low education compared to the most advantaged group.
Hence, the effects found in this paper are quite substantial.
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to study whether and how
welfare generosity is related to the risk of social exclusion
in terms of non-participation, associated with combinations
of poor health, low education and economic inactivity.
The results from our multilevel analysis of 21 European
countries in the European Social Survey (2006/2007)
demonstrated that welfare generosity decreased the risk of
social exclusion in the face of poor health in combination
with the risk factors of low educational attainment and
non-employment, at least in absolute terms (i.e. the
combined effect of the main effect of welfare generosity
and its group specific effects, see Figure 1). The effects of
welfare generosity on exclusion from formal and informal
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countries, indicating that all social groups benefitted
equally from welfare generosity in terms of social partici-
pation. The strongest group differences were found in
the model analysing the effect of welfare generosity for
combinations of health and education on non-participation
in informal networks, where relative inequalities between
groups were larger in more generous welfare states.
However, and importantly, in absolute terms the risk of
social exclusion among disadvantaged groups was still
far below the levels faced by the corresponding groups
in less generous welfare states. In contradiction to the
crowding-outhypothesis, welfare state generosity appeared
to benefit all individuals in terms of overall lower levels of
non-participation, both formal and informal. Our findings
are thus in line with previous findings that a compre-
hensive welfare state is positively associated with social
participation, [24,37].
Although it is not the main hypothesis of this paper, the
results also demonstrated that welfare resources did not
reduce the risk of social exclusion among disadvantaged
groups also in relative terms. To the contrary, our analysis
demonstrated that the most advantaged groups, in terms
of good health, employment and high educational attain-
ment, benefitted equally and in some instances more than
disadvantaged groups in terms of informal social participa-
tion. These findings contradict recent studies that demon-
strated that welfare generosity compensated disadvantaged
individuals more [21,39]. One interpretation of these
results is that individuals who are disadvantaged in health
combined with other social disadvantages benefit the most
from financial resources (benefits). Individuals who do
not face these disadvantages in health and social position
on the other hand, have sufficient financial resources, and
thus profit more from certain services; for example, child-
care services, freeing up additional time and opportunity
to participate [10]. In sum, all social groups benefit from
welfare generosity, but there are different mechanisms
underlying the associations for different social groups.
When the most advantaged individuals benefit more
than the disadvantaged, the already strong inclination to
participate in generous welfare states might be additionally
boosted by the same mechanism.
Strengths and limitations
While we outline a number of plausible theoretical path-
ways between welfare generosity and social participation,
we are not able to separate these in empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, we believe we are able to distinguish broadly
between our two theoretical perspectives, the welfare
resources perspective and the crowding-out theory. The
results of this paper are in consistence with the former
over the latter. Investigating the specific mechanisms
underlying the observed pattern, although an importantresearch agenda, is beyond the scope of this paper and
would also imply the use of longitudinal individual level
data. We do not, however, believe that the problem with
consistency between theoretical model and empirical
analysis is poorer than in most social science studies. In
fact, it can be argued that the use of multilevel statistical
methods which allows simultaneous investigation and
control for both individual level and country level vari-
ables – and interactions between the two levels, as well as
our operationalization of welfare generosity and focus on
disadvantaged groups, advance on previous studies in terms
of internal cohesion between theory and analysis.
There are however important limitations in this study.
One of them are the mean VIF values, which were greater
than 1 in all the analyses indicating a degree of multi-
collinearity (2.32 and 3.33, Tables 2(A) and 3(A) and 2.32
and 3.34, Tables 2(B) and 3(B) [53]. Given the fact that the
analyses included interaction terms we conclude that
multicollinearity was present, but did not represent a
substantial problem.
Further, the relationships between welfare generosity and
social participation might be influenced by confounding
variables. To test the validity of our findings we have thus
performed a series of sensitivity analyses.
Firstly, we included a measure for income inequality
(GINI) and country wealth (GDP), one by one in each
analysis. Neither income inequality nor country wealth
was significantly associated with non-participation in
informal networks. For both analyses of non-participation
in formal networks the results demonstrated a significant,
although weak (B = −0.00004), negative association with
country wealth. The association with welfare generosity
was no longer significant. However, there was a high level
of multicollinearity in these analyses, as the correlation
between the GDP measure and welfare generosity was
very high (Pearson’s r = 0.94). Thus we cannot separate
the effect of these two variables on non-participation
in formal networks (results available at request).
Ideally we would control for a number of level 2 variables.
Due to the low number of countries we lack statistical
power to include several contextual variables simultan-
eously in the same analyses. We also lack available com-
parable contextual data to control for distinct cultural
and/or historical factors. We however inspected country-
level residuals and performed sensitivity analyses by leaving
out the most outlying countries. The main results did not
substantially change, thus confirming the findings of this
paper (results available at request).
Additionally, we performed analyses to check whether
the effect of the combinations poor health and non-
employment in addition to poor health and low education
on non-participation in formal and informal networks,
respectively, varied across countries (random slope).
These analyses demonstrated that only the effect of the
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participation in informal networks proved significant
(results available on request). The insignificant results
might be related to lack of statistical power to fit random
slopes, as we only have 21 level 2 units.
To investigate the effects of the individual variables
on social participation we also analysed the associations
between respectively non-employment, low education
and poor health in interaction with welfare generosity
on non-participation. The analyses did not contradict the
results presented (results available upon request).
Because the aim of this paper was to study the risk of
social exclusion we found it theoretically most appropriate
to dichotomise the dependent variables despite the loss of
information. We however included an ordinal version of
informal participation with responses ranging from 1–7
(low-high), and a scaled variable for formal participation,
in multilevel linear regression analyses (xtmixed). Although
some results were not statistically significant within
conventional levels, the associations were in the same
direction as in the logistic regression analyses. We there-
fore conclude that this sensitivity analysis supports our
main findings. Lastly, although the European Social
Survey is an academically driven survey aiming at high
methodological standards and optimal comparability of
the data collected with a target response rate at 70%, the
actual achieved response rates of ESS round 3 (2006/7)
differ between countries [46,54].
Summing up, the findings in this paper must be
interpreted with caution. Despite the above mentioned
limitations, the findings nonetheless contribute important
insights into the way welfare generosity may moderate
the risk of social exclusion in terms of non-participation,
associated with poor health combined with other social
disadvantages. The results show that there is no indication
of a crowding-out tendency among disadvantaged groups
in more generous welfare states. On the contrary, resources
made available by the welfare state seem to matter to
all individuals in terms of overall lower levels of non-
participation. These results demonstrate the importance
of linking health related social exclusion to the social
policy context.
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